Governing for sustainable energy system change: politics, context and contingency by Kuzemko, Caroline et al.
OG
a
C
E
a
A
R
R
A
A
K
E
S
I
I
P
1
o
l
m
c
t
g
g
i
t
o
a
o
p
n
a
c
h
2Energy Research & Social Science 12 (2016) 96–105
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Energy  Research  &  Social  Science
jo ur nal home p age: www.elsev ier .com/ locate /erss
riginal  research  article
overning  for  sustainable  energy  system  change:  Politics,  contexts
nd  contingency
aroline  Kuzemko ∗,  Matthew  Lockwood,  Catherine  Mitchell,  Richard  Hoggett
nergy Policy Group, University of Exeter, United Kingdom
 r  t  i  c  l e  i  n  f  o
rticle history:
eceived 10 June 2015
eceived in revised form 14 October 2015
ccepted 10 December 2015
vailable online 31 December 2015
eywords:
nergy and climate governance
ustainable innovations
a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
This paper  offers  a new,  interdisciplinary  framework  for  the  analysis  of governing  for sustainable  energy
system  change  by  drawing  together  insights  from,  and  offering  critiques  of,  socio-technical  transitions
and  new  institutionalist  concepts  of  change.  Institutions  of  all kinds,  including  rules  and  norms  within
political  and  energy  systems,  tend  to  have  path-dependent  qualities  that  make  them  difﬁcult  to  change,
whereas  we  also  know  that  profound  change  has  occurred  in  the  past.  Current  decisions  to  pursue  climate
change  mitigation  by dramatically  changing  how  energy  is produced  and  used  depend  to some  extent
on  ﬁnding  the  right  enabling  conditions  for such  change.  The  approach  adopted  here  reveals  the  highly
political  and  contingent  nature  of attempts  to govern  for innovations,  how  political  institutions  mediatedeas
nstitutions and interests
rofound institutional change
differently  between  forces  for  sustainable  change  and forces  for continuity,  as  well  as  speciﬁc  interactions
between  governance  and  practice  change  within  energy  systems.  It concludes  that it is only by  being
speciﬁc  about  the  contingent  nature  of governing  for  innovations,  and  about  how  this  affects  practices  in
energy  systems  differently,  that  those  of us  interested  in  sustainability  can  credibly  advise  policy  makers
and  drive  for  greater  change.
©  2015  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ltd. This  is an open  access  article  under  the  CC BY  license. Introduction
This article presents a broad framework for analyzing processes
f governing for sustainable energy system change at the national
evel. Given the global nature of climate change as an issue area
uch policy and academic focus has to date been on complex pro-
esses of agreeing and setting international targets. Governance
argets that have been agreed, for instance on reducing greenhouse
as emissions, were put in place in order to achieve a 2 ◦C limit to
lobal temperatures rises from pre-industrial levels. However there
s mounting recognition that the 2 ◦C target may  not be sufﬁcient,1
hat it may  not even be met, and that international targets are only
ne part of the governance answer. Indeed what is needed now is
nalysis that helps us along the road to a far greater understanding
f governing for climate mitigation at the national level, its various
ossibilities and constraints (see [46]).In its current guise the aim of much national level climate gover-
ance is to meet greenhouse gas emissions targets by transitioning
way from centralized, fossil fuel based energy systems through
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: C.Kuzemko@exeter.ac.uk (C. Kuzemko).
1 This recognizes the COP21 agreement reached in Paris in December 2015, where
ountries agreed to aspire to limit warming to 1.5◦ .
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2015.12.022
214-6296/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article u(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
sustainable energy innovations. Speciﬁcally, energy sector targets
have been set and new policies have been chosen in order to enable
low carbon energy production and reduce demand. What is becom-
ing apparent, however, is that despite the tendency to focus on
these particular energy innovations energy systems exhibit dif-
ferent degrees and types of change. For example Denmark and
Germany have both tended to view renewable energy as the pre-
ferred form of low carbon generation, managing to substantially
increase renewable generation which, in turn, is also decentralized
and owned by smaller groups within society [5]. The UK, by con-
trast, considers nuclear power to be a sustainable energy source,
has enabled relatively less new generation from renewable sources,
whilst almost all renewable energy production is owned by large
corporations (see [82,23]) This prompts the question of why path-
ways of change have been so divergent even among developed
countries given that change is in response to the desire to mitigate
for climate change via sustainable energy innovations.
This can be explained by observing that countries make dif-
ferent governance choices as part of the highly complex, and in
some senses unprecedented, process of enabling profound energy
system change whilst also ensuring affordable and secure energy
services. What is needed, therefore, is an explanation of why
governance varies, under what conditions and with what implica-
tions for sustainable energy transitions. We  draw here on insights
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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rom socio-technical transitions (STT) literatures, about how com-
lex energy systems operate and change, and from sociological
nstitutionalist concepts about political institutions, policymaking
rocesses and change. STT concepts help us to bear in mind that
nergy systems are made up of multiple, inter-connected areas, that
nnovation is crucial to sustainable change, whilst also arguing that
the right) governance is important in enabling sustainable inno-
ations. We,  however, somewhat problematize these insights by
rguing that governing for sustainable energy innovations is con-
ingent both upon broader domestic political institutions as well as
n indigenous energy resources. Different conﬁgurations of politi-
al institutions and energy resources will tend to inﬂuence types of
overnance choices made and, therefore also, the nature of changes
hat take place in energy systems.
This allows us to focus our analysis on the ways in which
ifferent domestic contexts inter-relate with energy and climate
overnance, as well as to explore the ways in which choices made
hen enable or constrain sustainable energy system change. This
pproach can offer answers to some of the research questions raised
y Sovacool [77] in his introductory article to this journal, in par-
icular questions 51, 54, 57 and 59 that are about types of politics
nd forms of governance and how they interact with outcomes,
uch as sustainable transformations, in energy systems. However,
t does so in a way that reveals and explains some of the nuances
ontained within understandings of what is ‘optimal’ in terms of
nergy system outcomes and why.
This paper proceeds as follows: the next section draws on STT
iteratures to offer up important insights into how complex energy
ystems work but also how they transition, and the theoretical role
f governance in enabling sustainable change. The next sections
pply insights from new institutionalism to reveal the many ways in
hich different political institutions inﬂuence governance choices
ade. The last section brings these insights together and offers up
 broad, inter-disciplinary framework for the analysis of govern-
ng for sustainable energy innovations that highlights the many
nd complex inter-actions between relevant areas involved within
rocesses of change.
. Socio-technical systems and transitions
STT is a broad, inter-disciplinary academic approach, aspects of
hich have also been applied to innovation policy in some coun-
ries [42]. It has been informed over time by studies of science,
echnology and innovation, environmental and evolutionary eco-
omics and by the history and sociology of technology ([73]: p. 471;
51]: p. 957).
.1. Socio-technical fossil fuel systems
Within STT literatures socio-technical systems are understood
s being made up of a wide range of analytically separable
ut dynamically inter-related areas—for example user practices,
he environment, infrastructures, technology, corporate groups,
ivil society, institutions and politics ([19]: p. 2262; [62]: p. 16).
ach socio-technical system has its own complex conﬁgurations
etween these areas that together make up an entire system of
onsumption and production—thereby directly relating technolog-
cal functions to the delivery of social needs and practices ([76]: p.
36; [51]: p. 956). Any given socio-technical system is, in addition,
ikely to actively inter-relate with and provide a context for other
ocio-technical systems ([19]: p. 2262). For example fossil fuel and
ransport systems have been intrinsically inter-linked historically
nd practices in each area have tended to both inﬂuence and sup-
ort certain, carbon intensive, practices in the other. As such they
an be understood, when taken together, as making up one broaderocial Science 12 (2016) 96–105 97
area in which powerful path-dependencies have arisen that have
so far tended to constrain sustainable changes.
According to one prominent STT framework, the multi-level per-
spective (MLP), energy systems are understood as ‘regimes’ that
interact in practice across and between two  other levels: the ‘socio-
technical landscape’ and ‘niche innovations’. These levels are taken
as heuristic, analytical concepts that help to explain both how sys-
tems operate and how they change ([24]: p. 399). The landscape
level represents the ‘external structural context’ for the regime
level and is made up of social and physical factors such as broad
political coalitions, socio-cultural norms, paradigms, and economic
growth ([24]: p. 400; [76]: p. 440). The niche level, as will be further
explained below, is highly signiﬁcant in that this is where radi-
cal innovations, which can pioneer new ways of constituting and
satisfying social demands, are understood to emerge [40,24].
The regime, which constitutes mainstream ways of realizing
various social functions, sits between landscape and niche lev-
els and provides the ‘selection environment’ for new technologies
and other innovations ([76]: p. 440). The energy regime incorpo-
rates not just ‘technological regimes’, consisting of the routines of
engineers and ﬁrms [56], the ‘rule-sets’ of complex engineering
practices, skills and product characteristics embedded in institu-
tions and infrastructures [61], but also the rules and practices
of other groups, including: ‘energy users, policy makers, societal
groups, energy producers, capital banks etc.,’ ([21]: p. 1259–60).
These sets of rules and practices tend to stabilize existing trajecto-
ries and other regime members but also, importantly, blind actors
to new developments outside their focus ([24]: p. 400). One  analysis
focuses more on corporate elements of regimes by locating certain
actors in ‘industry regimes’, which are ‘a set of industry-speciﬁc
institutions. . .that enable and constrain behavior and action’ ([83]:
p. 37). These actors are inﬂuenced by developments in the economic
environment, for example supply chains and markets, and the
socio-political environment, such as relationships between indus-
try actors and policy makers, civil society and the public. Industry
actors also importantly act to inﬂuence these developments via
economic, innovation and political strategies, including lobbying,
and public relations.
What this deﬁnition of an energy system offers is overt recogni-
tion of the path-dependent nature of regimes as well as of the wide
range of actor groups that are involved within energy systems and
of their active and ongoing inter-connections – a point to which
we return below in Section 4 when laying out our framework for
theorising governance and innovation within energy transitions.
2.2. Socio-technical transitions
Despite such path dependencies transitions are nevertheless
possible, and historically have been achieved on a number of
occasions - including in energy systems [59,18]. A socio-technical
transition is described as a large-scale transformation within
society during which the structure of the socio-technical sys-
tem fundamentally changes. Transitions are made up of sets of
interconnected changes that reinforce each other but, as with con-
ceptualisations of regimes, also take place across and between
several different areas and levels ([62]: p. 2). Transitions, fur-
thermore, often take place over considerable periods of time, for
example one analysis of transitions in the UK, over the past 200
years, observes that it took on average 150 years for new technolo-
gies and services to emerge and to diffuse ([18]: p. 6592). This last
observation is important when thinking about sustainable energy
innovations as part of the process of mitigating for climate change
within temporal constraints, and about the degree of urgency that
these constraints imply.
In terms of conceptualizing how change takes place the empha-
sis tends to be on the potential for emergent technological
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nnovations, which enable new social practices, to challenge and
eplace existing regimes. Technical innovations are, however, nov-
lties and are ‘initially unstable. . . conﬁgurations’ which is why
iches need to act as ‘incubation rooms’ protecting novelties
gainst mainstream market selection until they are ready to com-
ete [40]. Technologies still in the niche phase tend, furthermore, to
ave poor technical performance and to be relatively expensive. In
his regard a long-term commitment to research, development and
emonstration (RD&D) is considered vital to their long-term viabil-
ty and success (see [38]). Niches can be understood, therefore, as
aving the potential for revolutionary socio-technical change ([76]:
. 440). One speciﬁc instance in which niches can break through is
f external landscape developments simultaneously ‘create pres-
ures on the regime that lead to cracks, tensions and windows of
pportunity’ ([22]: p. 495; see also [41]). An example of this is new
cientiﬁc knowledge about climate change putting sustained pres-
ure on current regimes of energy production and consumption to
hange.
Sustainable energy transitions, to the extent that they are taking
lace, have been described as involving changes to societal prac-
ices of energy use; innovation and deployment of a range of low
arbon technologies; and a broader change in the mix  of indus-
ries within national and global economies ([19]: p. 2258). Such
hanges infer not only new production and consumption patterns
ut also that different social groups, for example new energy com-
anies, producers, distributors and retailers, will beneﬁt from the
rocess of transition whilst others may  face substantial losses ([18]:
. 6591). As Meadowcroft puts it:
conﬂict is often rife with technological development with economic
ivals disputing the course of development and resistance coming from
hose on whom the costs of change are to be imposed (lost jobs, envi-
onmental externalities, regional decline, and so on) (2005: 488)
With regard to high-carbon, fossil fuel energy regimes some
ncumbent actors, given the vast scale of capital sunk in existing
ystems, have tended to pitch their, often not inconsiderable, assets
t resisting change - or at least at inﬂuencing what kind of change
akes place ([18]: p. 6592). In the face of this resistance radical new
echnologies can have a hard time breaking through because pre-
xisting rules, regulations, infrastructure, user practices and supply
hains can tend to align to support and enable the continuity in
echnological systems [84,23]. We  are interested in questions of
hat political conditions allow for resistance to be successful in
onstraining sustainable change—and return to this in section 4
elow.
.3. Governance and transitions
Historical studies of system transitions claim that technologi-
al innovations and market actors have been the main drivers of
hange [18], albeit one extensive study claims that governance
as been important in distributing the beneﬁts of new tech-
ologies more broadly across society [59]. In today’s sustainable
nergy transition, however, the role of deliberate attempts to cre-
te rules, incentives and institutions to actually initiate and drive
he transition is considered distinctive. As Markard et al. put it
(o) ne particularity of sustainability transitions is that guidance
nd governance often play a particular role” ([51]: p. 956). These
onceptualizations of sustainable energy transitions as purposive
et the current sustainability transition apart from previous, less
irected energy transitions, indeed one recent scholar has claimed
hat this is the ﬁrst transformation in history that has to be achieved
purposefully and against a deadline” [67].The heavy inference here is that governance matters to the suc-
ess of sustainable energy transitions. STT scholars tend to focus
n the need for political interventions, such as feed-in-tariffs for
enerators of renewable energy, to nurture and shield technolog-ocial Science 12 (2016) 96–105
ical innovations until they are ready to emerge and disseminate
[40,74,60]. Recent scholarship has suggested that “politically-
inspired” regime destabilization may  also be necessary to create
opportunities for the wider diffusion of renewables given that, in
practice, they face heavy resistance from existing regime actors
([23]: p. 37). This infers that successful governance should provide
leadership by clearly articulating the scientiﬁc consensus about
environmental pressures as well as providing long-term conviction,
direction and positively linking technical innovations to prominent
socio-political agendas([75]: p. 1496; [60]: p. 5).
STT literatures have therefore done much to emphasize the
importance of governance and to outline possible, albeit broad,
roles but it has its limitations in application to an analysis of gov-
erning for sustainable energy transitions. One prominent scholar
has recently suggest that there has been too much emphasis on
enabling niche actors within green energy transitions and too lit-
tle consideration of regime actors and their abilities to inﬂuence
energy governance ([23]: p. 23). Geels has also referred to certain
political practices and institutions as part of energy regimes ([21]: p.
1259–60), but politics otherwise seems to take place rather amor-
phously at the exogenous ‘landscape’ level. There is little sense of
the context within which governing for sustainable transition takes
place, of power relations between the relevant actor groups, or of
whether and how some actors are more inﬂuential than others over
governance decision-making processes. Furthermore, although STT
theories allow for a constitutive role for culture, interpretive frame-
works, historically embedded norms and power structures, more
needs to be done to understand how they affect policy choices,
rules, regulations and outcomes (see also [51]: p. 956; [70]: p. 710;
[75]: p. 1508).
A second, but related, limitation is the tendency to focus on pre-
scribing policies, often related to enabling new innovations, rather
than questioning the political and institutional conditions that make
the adoption of sustainability policies likely within certain contexts
([53]: p. 73; cf. [72]: p. 4; [1]: p. 119). Although there is some recog-
nition that policies that effectively enable energy innovations in one
culture can dramatically differ from those that work in another,
there has been too little attempt to explore why this might be the
case ([1]: p. 119). Such over simpliﬁcations of governing for sus-
tainable innovations mean that all too often, prospects for more
diverse, creative and progressive forms of social and political trans-
formation are conﬂated, in theory and practice, “. . .into a seemingly
amorphous, singular, depoliticized ‘way forward”’ ([79]: p. 5). As
a result, the politics of governing for energy system transforma-
tions can come across as being quite straightforward in theoretical
discussions, when the reality has been quite different in many coun-
tries (see for example [42]).
3. New institutionalist theories
This lack of a more developed account of politics in such theo-
ries may  be in part because, as Meadowcroft ([52]: p. 486) notes,
“. . .the notion of ‘transition’ is drawn primarily from literatures on
technological change”, rather than on politics or sociology. Such
omissions are important because “. . .in evading such issues, it is as
if the key questions are simply about whether to be ‘green’ or not,
rather than about the radically different political understandings
and actions that underpin these claims” ([79]: p. 4).
3.1. Institutional contexts and why they matterA good starting point in providing a better account of politics,
and what lies behind energy and climate governance decisions and
practices, is the ‘new’ institutionalism that has come to play a cen-
tral role in political theory over the last 30 years. Like STT this is
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ot a uniﬁed body of thought but comprises a number of differ-
nt approaches to the analysis of politics and governance ([29]: p.
36). New institutionalist approaches are, however, uniﬁed by the
otion that institutions, understood broadly as regularized prac-
ices underpinned by formal and informal rules, procedures and/or
orms, mediate politico-economic relations in multiple but varied
ays ([30]: p. 9–10). This section emphasizes, in particular, those
pproaches that understand policy both as socially constructed
nd as inﬂuenced and structured by sets of ideas and interests
27,4,17,65]. Ideas are understood to have a role both in constitut-
ng political action but in “the (re) construction of political interests
nd values.  . .”  ([65]: p. 2).2
One of the most used explanatory devises within new insti-
utionalism is that of the policy paradigm which not only refers
o ideas as explanatory variables but reveals the ways in which
deas can become embedded in formal, and informal, governance
ractices over time [27]. The importance of ideas in policy-making
rocesses has been explained by proposing them as the link
etween context and conduct, institutions and behaviors or, in
ther words, as part of the ‘why’ of analyzing actions ([31]: p.
53). Indeed, sets of ideas once embedded within formal politi-
al processes can mediate between interest groups and inﬂuence
hich voices are ‘heard’ in political debates and which are not. STT
pproaches introduced us to the notion of energy regimes as repre-
enting set norms and practices at the level of system actors, such
s companies and end users of technological services. New institu-
ionalism enables us to focus on policymakers, such as politicians,
egulators and civil servants, in order to explore why they make the
ecisions they do, how they interact with other actors, and with
hat consequences for sustainable change.
As Hall ([27]: p. 279) observed:
. . .policymakers customarily work within a framework of ideas and
tandards that speciﬁes not only the goals of policy and the kind of
nstruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature
f the problems that they are meant to be addressing.  . .
In addition to the ability of the framework of ideas, or policy
aradigm, to inﬂuence important decisions such as the choice of
bjectives and instruments of policy it can also inﬂuence choices
f more precise policy settings (including regulations). Ideas, once
ccepted, can become so embedded within policy-making pro-
esses that they can emerge as orthodoxy, taken for granted, and
ighly self-referential (ibid: 279; see also [6]). This makes them
ard to challenge and infers a degree of path-dependency. In addi-
ion to inﬂuencing choices of policy objectives, instruments and
ettings frameworks of ideas can also delimit who is deemed appro-
riate to work within and/or act as expert advisors in policymaking
ircles ([6]: p. 378, [53]: p. 73). Certain sets of ideas can be dominant
ithin wider society also and some scholars have explored how, in
ationally speciﬁc ways, policy-makers frame policy ideas to make
hem palatable to public audiences ([7]: p. 4). Indeed established
ets of ideas become knowledge that can then be passed on within
ociety through education and vocational training.
The concept of policy paradigm has often been used to identify
nd explore the turn from Keynesian to neoliberal forms of eco-
omic governance across many OECD countries since the 1980s
27,33,4]. One claim is that, for a decade or so, the liberal market
aradigm was the principal context within which energy policy
2 Although some within the broad church of new institutionalism argue that the
ays in which actors conceive of their interests are inﬂuenced (more or less heavily)
y  institutions and ideas others argue that interests are more ﬁxed and/or material.
ertainly many actors will perceive of their interests as material but they may  also
ust  be unaware of ideas and institutions that inform and constrict them. There is not
he time here to enter too deeply into these debates but for interesting discussions
n  the relationship between interests and ideas see: [4,32,89].ocial Science 12 (2016) 96–105 99
decisions were made and narratives of competition, economic efﬁ-
ciency and liberal markets dominated both climate and energy
governance policy decision-making ([57]: p. 6–8; see also [34]).
Market liberal ideas prescribed, among other things, particular
roles for states and markets in economic governance with the gen-
eral preference being for a withdrawal of the overloaded state.
Indeed OECD and non-OECD countries, sometimes as part of IMF
loan conditions, liberalized and often also privatized their energy
sectors in order to become, in theory, more competitive and eco-
nomically efﬁcient. For example, Mitchell’s [55] account of the UK
energy system argues that UK political institutions have skewed the
overall nature of energy governance toward inertia for a decade or
so. This includes a reasonably dominant ideological commitment
to placing markets rather than government at the center of deliv-
ering policy objectives such as energy security and/or sustainable
energy system change. Given their size, and breadth of market cov-
erage, this political choice has tended to assign important roles to
incumbent energy companies over emergent niches. In this way
also energy and economic policy areas have, to some extent and
for a period of time, co-evolved and been inﬂuenced by similar sets
of ideas. In his recent analysis of energy and capital [88] argues that
norms reifying the market have allowed for powerful capital inter-
ests to inﬂuence energy policy and, thereby, to reproduce fossil fuel
capitalism.
It is not assumed, however, that all developed economies have
become equally market liberal nor indeed that there are no credi-
ble contestations of liberal market orthodoxies generally or, more
speciﬁcally, in energy and climate policymaking circles. One of
the most important applications of the new institutionalist theory
has been in the exploration of institutional diversity in capitalist
economies and the implications for how state market relations are
conducted, for the distribution of system costs and beneﬁts, and
for equity. Schmidt ([66]: p. 113) notes that in some countries,
like the UK, Australia and the USA, governments have the character
of a liberal arbiter, with less prescriptive or co-ordinated relation-
ships with the private sector. In other countries, such as Germany,
Sweden, Finland and Denmark, governments are associated with
social democracy and greater collective and/or coordinative capac-
ities. These are countries where state bodies can engage directly,
on an ongoing basis, in shaping the economy ([7]: p. 14; see also
[28]). There are other aspects of political institutions that also have
relevance when exploring the context within which governing for
sustainable energy innovations takes place. Iversen and Soskice
[37] argue that the proportional representation (PR) voting sys-
tem, used in 21 out of 28 European countries, tends to be more
representative of voters’ wishes and more inclusive of smaller polit-
ical parties like the Green Party. By contrast, the ﬁrst-past-the-post
system, which the UK still favors, is understood to engender more
adversarial and centralized politics ([32]: p. 205), and often results
in two-party systems with less room for smaller parties to be inﬂu-
ential.
However it should also be noted there are important differences
between countries that are labeled as social democracies or as mar-
ket liberal. The work of Berman [3] shows a marked difference in
the evolution of social democratic ideas, and their inﬂuence over
policymaking, in Germany and Sweden. It should be noted too that
there are also important differences in political rules and norms
even within countries. As we have seen in the case of Denmark
very different energy governance decisions can be taken depend-
ing upon which political party or coalition is in power, but there can
in addition be considerable differences in how particular sectors are
governed. For example even in countries where market liberal ideas
tend to be most inﬂuential over policy decision making processes
there are some sectors, in particular defence and/or health, that are
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onsidered to require high degrees of state involvement (see [11]:
. 441–2). This is a point to which we return in section 4.2.
.2. Institutions, change and energy
Section 3.1 has argued that frameworks of ideas can become
mbedded within institutions and that institutions, in the form
f regularized practices, rules and norms, inﬂuence governance
ecision-making processes. What we are most interested in here,
owever, is explaining both governance for energy system change
nd related processes of change within energy systems. Our inter-
st in processes of governance change is based on the argument,
rom STT literatures, that greater political assistance is required to
nable more innovations, as well as on current arguments about the
ikelihood of missing the 2 ◦C warming target [36]. Together these
nfer that quite considerable governance change is still needed (see
lso [64]).
Sociological institutionalists, as opposed to their historical
nstitutionalist colleagues, tend to conceptualize governance as
ynamic and subject to change over time. There are a number
f suggestions about the conditions under which profound gover-
ance changes can happen: for example in the event of a signiﬁcant
arty political shift as the result of a general election, during
imes of crisis and uncertainty, or more gradually via an accumula-
ion of new rules and norms over time [27,4,49]. There are some
imilarities between how STT scholars conceptualize change in
ocio-technical systems and how new institutionalists understand
overnance change. Change is enabled, from both perspectives,
hen there is recognition that a problem exists and that current
echnologies and/or governance are not addressing these problems
[4]: p. 10; [85]: p. 6). More speciﬁcally, there needs to be some
orm of debate about what the problem is, what needs to change
nd why. Alternative ideas, if articulated successfully, can play a
umber of different important roles within such debates - not least
y shedding new light on embedded institutions, and associated
overnance choices, thereby making them more overt and amend-
ble to scrutiny. Alternative narratives, speciﬁcally, can not only
stablish that a problem exists, but they can also offer explana-
ions of why a problem exists, provide proof of failure of existing
overnance to address these issues, as well as provide new policy
olutions and ways of doing things ([43]; see also [33,4]).
This is no easy process and to successfully contest established
overnance orthodoxies the ways in which new ideas are articu-
ated will need to directly engage with and contest the assumptions
nderpinning policy-making and they must also gain legitimacy on
heir own terms ([6]: p. 385). In this way politics can be understood
s an ongoing struggle for power and inﬂuence played out in sig-
iﬁcant part through arguments about the ‘best story’ at any point
n time ([17]: p. x).
What is also of note here is that processes of governance change,
here existing orthodoxies are contested and destabilized, can be
ontentious not least because change of a profound nature, as with
ocio-technical regimes, infers new winners and losers and is, as
uch, deeply political. Although credible, well-articulated, alterna-
ive narratives can drive change there will be those that work to
esist change, sometimes through reference to existing rules and
orms. In this way the nature of change that takes place will be
elated to the speciﬁc battle of ideas that make up debates about
ow to proceed and to the compromises struck between positions
n each country. These debates may  take place in elite, policy-
aking and ‘expert’ circles only, or may  be more open across society
8]. More inclusive change, and thereby potentially with greater
ocietal buy-in, will involve long-term, broad and transparent pro-
esses of deliberation [79]. Either way new forms of governance will
ften be shaped by existing institutions—this is not least because
deas are narrated in relation to that which currently exists but alsoocial Science 12 (2016) 96–105
because change is relative and represents a form of compromise
reached between narratives for continuity and for change.
Within energy policy literatures claims have emerged that pro-
found shifts in energy governance have, for some time, been
ongoing [34,63,8]. Others have questioned how so much policy
change can in some instances lead to so little change of a sus-
tainable nature in energy systems [43]. These analyses, like STT
approaches, emphasize the challenge from new scientiﬁc knowl-
edge about anthropogenic climate change as a considerable new
driving force for change to existing energy governance. What we
highlight here, however, is that narratives about energy supply (in)
security, often informed by geopolitical ideas, and concerns about
declining affordability have also been inﬂuencing changes in energy
policy objectives and instruments (see [34,25,45]). As such the real-
ity is that energy governance has in most countries, but also in
organizations like the International Energy Agency (IEA), become
about achieving security and affordability objectives in addition to
climate mitigation. If energy governance is to be successful, there-
fore, it now needs to balance these demands and different countries
may  prioritize differently between the trilemma of policy objec-
tives. For example the UK has, for energy security and economic
growth reasons, recently adopted new policies designed to support
greater oil and gas exploration and development and through the
new Capacity Market, to reward fossil fuel-ﬁred electricity plants
[13]. In this way other, including non-energy, policy objectives can
be prioritized over sustainable innovations.
This identiﬁcation of multiple political drivers for change,
and multiple objectives that energy governance is increasingly
designed to achieve, tends to reveal the complex context within
which governing for sustainable energy innovations takes place.
The nature of new policies chosen will reﬂect the push and pull
between new ideas about climate change, ideas about the need
for energy security and affordability as mediated by the broader
institutional context ([45]: p. 200–201). When considering how
domestic political institutions can inﬂuence processes of gover-
nance change for sustainable energy it is worth turning brieﬂy to
some comparative analytical work [10,11,54]. Some analyses of
relative performances in environmental and climate change mit-
igation argue that countries with historical tendencies to govern
actively toward meeting social goals, such as a sustainable energy
transition, have capacities not as readily available to more market
liberal economies ([11]: p. 441). Another claim is that countries that
are capable of supporting the kinds of welfare policies that, in turn,
more equitably redistribute the effects of energy system change
will have more of a chance for long-term success [10,48]. This is
because more equitable system change can underpin greater soci-
etal support for continued sustainability innovations. Furthermore,
countries with PR voting systems, that allow for a greater Green
voice within formal political organizations, also enable govern-
ments to be more goal orientated and to prioritize climate change
when devising new energy policies [68,16].
Taken together this paints a somewhat messy, complex and
ongoing picture of governance change that is hard to analytically
pinpoint—especially when the direction of change is mixed and/or
changes regularly. Those countries that ﬁnd it hard to prioritize cli-
mate mitigation over other policy objectives in instances of trade
offs, or indeed that do not plan for trade offs, are more likely to
exhibit this more messy process of change.
4. Governance and innovations in sustainable energy
transitions
In section 4.3 we  offer up our new framework for analyzing
domestic processes of governing for sustainable energy innova-
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fossil fuel industries and/or which are still to an extent economi-
cally dependent on fossil fuel income streams tend to privilege the
narratives of these important actor groups. Here embedded institu-C. Kuzemko et al. / Energy Resear
ions, but only after we have made some important new points
f clariﬁcation in sections 4.1 and 4.2.
.1. Linking governance with practices and outcomes
Applied to theorizing governance for energy innovations, insti-
utionalist theories can tell us more about the contingent and
omplex nature of energy governance and about drivers for change.
owever, the weakness of new institutionalist approaches, for our
urposes, is that they focus too narrowly on the political and pol-
cy domains and, as such, tend not to provide methods of exploring
inks between policy and practice change in energy systems [43].
ere we return to STT arguments that in order to establish sustain-
ble energy systems there need to be profound practice changes,
or example in how energy is produced and used. One practical
ay, however, of linking governance to practices in energy sys-
ems is to consider how important industry actors, incumbents
nd new companies, are inﬂuenced by policies and vice versa (i.e.,
hat opportunities do different companies have to inﬂuence pol-
cy). In order to make these links research needs to move beyond
he energy policies and objectives analyzed above to include reg-
lations and market rules, including corporate codes of practice,
ithin the analysis (see also [64]). Our framework, therefore, takes
nto account the full range of governance processes that have a bear-
ng upon corporate practices in the energy system. It is for this
eason that we refer to governance, rather than energy policy or
egulation speciﬁcally.
This may  well make analysis more complex but it is based on
he recognition that governing for sustainable energy innovations
oes not exist within a governance vacuum but that, in practice,
ystem actors must respond to multiple policies, regulations and
arket rules. It is also important to note that some companies,
or example those following non-traditional/innovative business
odels, will respond differently to energy governance than estab-
ished, incumbent market actors. Indeed, the point we are making
s that it is the entirety of energy governance that shapes practices,
nd whether they change or not, in energy systems. For example
n the UK measures, such as the Green Deal and Energy Company
bligation (ECO), were put in place to encourage energy efﬁciency
nnovations but their effects on practices in energy systems were
onstrained by a host of other rules and regulations that tended to
ncentivize a supply orientation in the energy system as a whole
86]. In effect, therefore, new sustainable energy policies can co-
xist in practice with pre-existing policies, regulations and rules
hat drive less sustainable practices. This is partly because pre-
xisting governance processes were often put in place prior to the
doption of new climate mitigation public policy goals. This can
ffer us another explanation as to why new sustainable energy poli-
ies do not necessarily equate in practice to sustainable changes in
nergy systems [43].
By understanding governing for sustainable innovations as part
f a more complex political whole this allows us to question
hich interactions between governance actors and actors in energy
ystems are delivering sustainable practice change and which con-
train such change. Just as this is true for scholarly research so
hould this also be true for policymaking analysis. Energy gover-
ance and policy-making processes must be regularly measured
ccording to energy system outcomes, sustainable and otherwise,
nd be ﬂexible enough to change if necessary. One reasonably suc-
essful example of this is in Germany where regular adjustments
re made to policies and regulations according to energy system
utcomes such as falling costs of renewable energy, growth in emis-
ions and/or impacts on electricity wholesale markets of greater
uantities of renewable energy [69].ocial Science 12 (2016) 96–105 101
4.2. Deﬁning energy and climate actor groups
We argue further that in order to understand governance for sus-
tainable energy innovations and how it relates to practice change
it is also necessary to understand the historical energy landscape:
who the important actor groups are, what interests they repre-
sent and their relationship to governance. The precise nature of
historical relationships between energy actor groups and political
organizations will have had implications for choices made at points
in time and for the nature of energy governance institutions (rules
and norms). Indeed, one recent analysis of energy system change
has argued that there has been too much focus in STT analyses on
niches as enabling innovations to emerge and too little attempt to
differentiate between actors within processes of change and anal-
ysis of regime resistance ([23]: p. 23). Whilst we concur with this
observation our approach, as outlined in section 3, tends concep-
tualize the politics of governing for sustainable energy innovations
as being in part about multiple actor groups, forces for sustainable
change and for continuity, how they compete within debates about
sustainable change and what compromises are struck. This involves
differentiation between actors groups, but also a consideration of
which speciﬁc actor groups are involved in seeking to inﬂuence pol-
icymakers during change debates, what their arguments are and
how these are mediated by political institutions.
In section 2 it was  explained that sustainable energy system
change has profound implications for a number of inter-connected
energy regime actors: oil, gas, electricity (generation and supply)
and associated supply chains. As a reminder, profound shifts in
the energy system toward sustainability imply new ‘winners’ and
‘losers’ and those that stand to gain or lose out will be at the heart of
change debates. In some countries it has been observed that regime
actors, in the form of incumbent energy companies, tend to act
as forces for continuity and new innovators act as forces for sus-
tainable change [78], but this is not always the case. Actors groups
will seek to inﬂuence governance and to inform and/or control the
terms of debate about system change. Their ability, however, to
be inﬂuential will depend, as already discussed, on domestic polit-
ical institutions and inferred power relations (see also [23]). We
argue that what also needs to be considered when understanding
incumbent regime actors, and their ability to be politically inﬂu-
ential, is the historical economic and political importance of the
industries they represent. Fossil fuels are geographically ﬁxed, geo-
logically ﬁnite and have been unevenly distributed within a world
still delineated according to sovereign states [26,57].3 Furthermore,
it has made material historical difference to countries if they have
had access to indigenous fossil fuels whilst energy companies have
over time made considerable ﬁnancial contributions to GDP  and
have employed large numbers of people. Indeed, because of the
material importance of fossil fuels to economic development in
the 19th and 20th centuries, some scholars have linked generous
domestic endowments of coal and oil to global economic power
and inﬂuence [80], partly also explaining why  fossil fuels have so
often provided reason for conﬂict [50]. Countries without such nat-
ural endowments, conversely, have often had to establish political
and economic networks of access to vital fossil fuels and have also
been more vulnerable to energy crises such as the 1970s oil shocks.
It is partly for these reasons that countries with long-standing3 Even the EU, despite decades of attempting to liberalize energy, recognizes the
sovereign right of member states to ‘determine conditions for exploiting its energy
resources, its choice between different energy sources and the general structure of
its  energy supply’ ([15]: 135).
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ions will reﬂect economic reliance on fossil fuel industry incomes
nd there may  be strong (formal) relationships with policymak-
rs (see [58]). Formal political organizations, such as government
epartments, may  have long histories of working to maintain the
upply orientation of energy systems in line with historic energy
ndustries, including also nuclear. Actor groups representing these
ndustries can often mobilize considerable ﬁnancial and knowledge
apital behind inﬂuencing the terms of media and political debates
mphasizing the need to innovate in ways that will ensure their
urvival [18,23]. Given the extent to which conventional energy
egimes are economically important their arguments can be con-
incing to both elite and some public audiences. As such it is
nderstandable that some governments still actively support con-
entional energy regimes in myriad different ways [35], as well
s support technological innovations like Carbon Capture and Stor-
ge (CCS) designed to improve rather than profoundly alter current
nergy systems [60].
It is also important to note however that some countries with-
ut, or with less access to, indigenous fossil fuel resources have
onger histories of making their energy systems sustainable. Some
cholars note that oil importer countries, such as Germany, Sweden
nd Denmark, responded more strongly to the 1970s oil shocks,
artly by making their economies more energy efﬁcient but also
y starting to encourage renewable energy generation [25,14].
enmark, for example, responded with an aggressive drive to
mprove efﬁciency (partly through district heating and CHP) as
ell as pursing wind power. Consistent and planned support for
uch innovations has meant that niches have had longer to develop
nd to diffuse more broadly. Sometimes this has required ﬁrm gov-
rnance decisions to privilege sustainable innovators over those
rguing forcibly against speciﬁc sustainability policies—for exam-
le in Germany in the late 1990s [38]. Indeed, as sustainable energy
ompanies grow in number this can lead to new energy lobbies, also
epresenting large-scale employment, ultimately allowing forces
or sustainable change to gain momentum. The ability to actively
urture multiple, small innovations and encourage their growth
ore closely exempliﬁes a marrying together of top down gover-
ance with bottom up drivers/possibilities for change [79].
Finally in this section it should be noted that forces for conti-
uity in energy systems and forces for sustainable change do not
nly include corporate actors but represent much broader coali-
ions. Forces for continuity can include independently inﬂuential
roups such as banks, pension funds and other associated supply
hain actors with sizable investments in energy regimes. They can
lso include climate sceptics, politicians and energy consumers,
arge and small, particularly those focused on the cost of energy
ver other factors (see [23]). Forces for change can be equally
iverse (see [38]: p. 259). It is worth noting up front that, under
ertain circumstances, incumbent energy companies can become
art of the process of change, as has been the case in Denmark and
ortugal ([47]: p. 102). Coalitions for sustainable change can also
nclude climate scientists, technology experts, NGOs, politicians,
olicymakers, international organizations, and consumers/voters
or whom environmental sustainability is important. They increas-
ngly also include investors in the form of the recently successful,
N backed, divestment campaigns like Fossil Free UK. What unites
his broad coalition is the drive for sustainable change but there
s considerable diversity visible in the broad, but not always com-
ensurable, range of solutions offered.
.3. framework for explaining varied governance and system
hangeWe  set out here our tentative conceptual framework for ana-
yzing governance for sustainable energy system change, and the
ontexts within which such processes take place (see Fig. 1). Asocial Science 12 (2016) 96–105
promised the framework brings insights from new institutionalism,
about political institutions and their relationship to policymakers
and policy choices, with STT insights about regime and niche actors
and about the vital need to link governance with practice change
in energy systems. In an attempt to be speciﬁc about governing for
sustainable energy system change we include forces for sustainable
change and for continuity within the framework given that analyt-
ical focus on these groups will tell us much about the precise terms
of change debates in different countries. To be clear the box marked
‘political institutions’ includes a broad spectrum of the domestic
political context, including formal and informal rules and norms
that have inﬂuenced the type of voting system as well as the breadth
of welfare provision. In addition political institutions are taken here
to include assumed hierarchies between economic, energy and cli-
mate policy objectives, and how energy, and climate, policymakers
and market actors should inter-relate in the pursuit of energy goals.
For example norms guiding important questions around whether
change should be market led, with government taking an incen-
tivising role, or whether government should take a leadership and
co-ordinating role through goal oriented governance.
What we have tried to make evident in Fig. 1 is the highly inter-
connected character of relationships between the different areas
whilst it is also assumed that inter-connections in all instances
work in both directions. Forces for sustainable change and for
continuity will utilize different narratives to inﬂuence energy pol-
icymakers and governance decisions, and again these debates
will vary according to political context and indigenous energy
resources. This, in turn, inﬂuences the nature of energy governance,
including hierarchies between policy objectives, choices of instru-
ments and regulations, market conditions for regime and niche
companies and, therefore, practices and outcomes. Ultimately, of
course, energy system change happens when practices change but
we emphasize here the deeply political nature of such change in an
attempt to explain the different choices made in pursuit of sustain-
able change and the forces ranged against it. New practices, as they
become more established over time, will provide new forces and
narratives for inﬂuencing governance for sustainable innovations.
What this helps us to understand is the complexity and degree of
contingency of governing for sustainable energy innovations and
why there is such variety in energy and climate governance and in
sustainable energy system changes in practice.
4.4. Governing for sustainable energy system change: Germany
and the UK
Given the space already taken here in explicating our framework
there remains sadly little room to apply the framework, and this
is work to which the authors intend to return in more detail in
future articles. What we  can do here is brieﬂy explain two different
governance processes, in the UK and Germany, in the light of our
framework.
As observed in the introduction to the paper the UK has man-
aged comparatively lower amounts of sustainable practice change
in energy systems in terms of renewables as a percent of energy con-
sumed, in terms of decentralizing supply and energy efﬁciency. But
it also still actively supports fossil fuel regimes through the Capacity
Mechanism and through new policies to enable maximum possi-
ble extraction of North Sea oil and gas as well as a new shale gas
industry (see [13]). One explanation given is that institutionalized,
market liberal, ideas that suggest a limited role for the state have
tended to work in practice against pro-active government leader-
ship and support for sustainable energy system change. Scholars
have observed that market liberal ideas have inﬂuenced energy
policymaking bodies in such as way as to narrow down the range
of acceptable policy options in response to climate change with
the emphasis being on market-based instruments [55,71,63]. This
C. Kuzemko et al. / Energy Research & Social Science 12 (2016) 96–105 103
of gov
h
i
m
i
t
r
m
d
a
a
i
l
r
s
a
s
t
f
c
d
(
t
T
p
w
a
t
r
c
b
t
p
r
c
s
e
t
i
tFig. 1. Interconnections within processes 
as also served to restrict the role of governance to ‘temporary
nterventions’ followed by a withdrawal of government involve-
ent once ‘market failures’ have been ﬁxed [12]. Market liberal
nstitutions have also resulted in a form of governance wherein
here has been a higher degree of delegation of responsibility to
egime actors and less activity to co-ordinate market actors toward
eeting legally binding climate targets.
An application of this framework, however, allows us to take
omestic political institutions, such as market liberalism, into
ccount whilst also considering the relationship between relevant
ctor groups and policymakers. We  would highlight the economic
mportance historically of the fossil fuel industry and the, related,
ong-standing relationships between UK energy policy makers and
egime actor groups as being analytically important. At the risk of
tating the obvious it should be noted that UK fossil fuel regime
ctors have tended not to argue strongly for sustainable energy
ystem change nor have they led the way in sustainable innova-
ions. In effect these formal and informal relations have allowed
or a greater degree of inﬂuence of forces for energy system
ontinuity over energy governance whilst new actors seeking to
evelop sustainable innovations, such as energy service companies
ESCOs), community renewables schemes and demand aggrega-
ors, have found it relatively harder to enter markets (see [87,44]).
he tendency to listen to important energy regime actors and the
reference for system continuity over change might also explain
hy the UK has chosen, despite its vast costs, to support nuclear
s a ‘low carbon’, domestic source of electricity. It might also help
o explain why it does not have targets for energy produced from
enewable sources beyond 2020.
This is not to say that climate mitigation and energy system
hange have not been on the political agenda nor that there has
een no debate about sustainable energy system change. Indeed
he UK adopted the Climate Change Act in 2008, a groundbreaking
iece of legislation given the legally binding nature of its emissions
eduction targets, as well as policies designed to enable energy efﬁ-
iency and renewable energy. The argument here is that there are
o many other aspects of the energy system debate, for example
nergy regime actor groups emphasizing the importance of domes-
ic energy supply security, that sustainability tends to lose out
n practice. Arguments for sustainable change are also sometimes
rumped by market liberal institutions that recommend near-termerning for sustainable energy transitions.
economic efﬁciency, as in the current narrative of ﬁscal austerity
that has very recently led to a withdrawal of some support for
onshore wind and solar as well as reduced welfare provision. In
addition, many pre-existing energy regulations and rules, such as
the extensive set of corporate codes and licences, were enacted
before climate mitigation became a political concern and still do not
have any sustainability mandates built in. These corporate codes,
as has been recently observed by the UK’s Competition and Mar-
kets Authority as part of their Energy Market Review, tend to stiﬂe
innovations in the form of new market entrants [9]. Taken together
this is a more exclusive form of energy governance that sends, at
best, mixed signals about how energy markets should change and
which has not yet provided conditions for innovations to grow suf-
ﬁciently nor for wider publics to become involved in and beneﬁt
from system change [79].
Energy system change in Germany has taken a different course
not least in terms of the rate of renewable energy growth and the
distributed nature of its energy transition [5,39]. As already sug-
gested some scholars claim that German political institutions allow
for more coordinative, and goal oriented relationships between pol-
icymakers and energy system actors. New institutionalist scholars
suggest that Germany’s political economy is not ‘market liberal’ in
nature, but has historically been more inﬂuenced by sets of ideas
about ordoliberalizm and by a version of social democracy [3,2].
Both these sets of ideas allow for a ‘strong state’ and a more active
role for government actors in determining socio-economic out-
comes, such as setting and meeting strict sustainability targets. The
PR voting system has allowed not only for greater Green represen-
tation in the Bundestag and some regional administrations, but it
has also required political actors to co-ordinate with other impor-
tant groups within government coalitions. As Schreurs [68] argues,
German Green political support has been vital in underpinning sus-
tainable energy governance decisions over the past decades, not
least in the decision to phase out nuclear power.
It is also notable that, partly in response to events of the 1930s
and 1940s, the German Federal system devolves political author-
ity more widely away from the center to the regions, or Länder.
What this has resulted in is more capacity at the regional and local
municipal levels to support and enable the distributed nature of
energy system change. An application of our framework also brings
historical energy infrastructures to light in explaining differences
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n energy transitions. It is notable that Germany, unlike the UK,
id not nationalize and centralize its energy system in the post-
WII  period [5], and as a result pre-existing gas and electricity
nfrastructures were more municipal based and supportive of the
istributed energy revolution. Again unlike the UK, forces for sus-
ainable change have also not had to contend with big domestic,
ut globally inﬂuential, oil and gas regime actors.
This is not to say that there has not been strong opposition
o sustainable energy system transition. Germany’s long-standing
oal industry still employs a not insigniﬁcant number of people
nd industry lobbies have formed a signiﬁcant element of the
ebate about how to transition German energy systems. Indeed,
he coal industry makes up only one part of the broad coalition
or continuity in Germany, which also includes the ‘Big 4′ gas and
lectricity companies and some groups representative of heavy
ndustry. Together they have mounted, and continue to mount, sus-
ained attacks on green energy policy decisions [38,20]. Indeed,
arious industrial groups have been sheltered from the costs of
hange, including large-scale energy users, whilst the coal industry
as so far had a relatively easy time of it.
But because political institutions have allowed for relatively
ore support for green innovations, with less distraction from the
eed to also govern in support of oil and gas industries, this has
esulted in an accumulation of the forces for sustainable change.
s new energy innovations have become more widely distributed
ithin the economy and society there is more buy-in to change as
ell as improved knowledge about how to build sustainable sys-
ems in practice [81,48]. The tendency to allow for social learning
ithin energy systems is to some degree matched by the willing-
ess of German policymakers to adapt policies and regulations as
arket conditions change, for example regular revisions to FiT sup-
ort levels as the cost of different renewable technologies fall [69].
astly, welfare policy directly supports vulnerable energy users by
aying for heating thereby making the effects of system change
ore equitable and reducing opposition on fuel poverty grounds.
. Conclusions
Following Sovacool [77], we have introduced here a framework
or analyzing sustainable energy system transitions that places gov-
rnance in a central position and which also explains how domestic
olitical institutions and historical energy infrastructures can dif-
erently inﬂuence the nature of change. We  have drawn out two
road lessons useful to those of us interested in greater under-
tandings of how sustainable energy system change occurs. The
rst is that a too narrow focus on governance will tend to result
n analysis that can identify policy and regulatory changes clearly,
ut will have too little to tell us about how practices in energy
ystems are responding to those governance changes. The second
s that there is a need to be precise about the domestic politi-
al context within which processes of governing for sustainable
hange take place. Indeed, what we have tried to make clear here
s that change is differential precisely according to the variety
f ways in which embedded institutions and indigenous energy
nfrastructures inter-relate with forces for sustainable change and
or continuity. What this means is that interdisciplinary analysis,
lthough often difﬁcult to pursue, can indeed provide us with a
ore nuanced and inter-connected account of types of governance
nd of energy system change.
The question that emerges from these observations is, however,
hether certain countries are predestined to lag behind others sim-
ly because of the types of institutions and energy regimes upon
hich their political systems have been built? This would certainly
e a bleak proposition given the degree to which current attempts
o mitigate for climate change are temporally constrained. How-
[
[ocial Science 12 (2016) 96–105
ever, it can also be argued that it is in understanding the nuances
and complexities of individual country governance for sustainable
energy transitions that we  can identify precise impediments to
change. It is only by being speciﬁc about which aspects of gov-
ernance tend to constrain rather than enable sustainable changes
that we can better communicate what needs to change, and what
the solutions should be, in ways that are tangible to elite and wider
audiences.
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